{"id":24839,"date":"2017-11-15T18:37:37","date_gmt":"2017-11-15T23:37:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/digital.hbs.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/"},"modified":"2017-11-30T12:52:49","modified_gmt":"2017-11-30T17:52:49","slug":"impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta","status":"publish","type":"hck-submission","link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/","title":{"rendered":"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA"},"content":{"rendered":"

Impact of global trade agreements on the auto industry and its supply chain \u2013 terminating nafta<\/h1>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

<\/h2>\n

shokouh shafiei<\/h2>\n

2019 MBA Candidate<\/h3>\n

性视界 Business School<\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Essay Word Count: 771 (does not include cover page or Exhibits)<\/p>\n

Isolationism and International Trade<\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

There are hardly any complex consumer products in the market that are truly made in one region. The auto industry is no exception.\u00a0 Even the TESLA Model S and X, the only vehicles claiming 100% assembly in the U.S., use outside suppliers for components such as the Canadian Auto Parts supplier, Magna International and Mexican Lithium miners Bacanora Minerals. 5<\/sup><\/p>\n

Global trade may date back as far as the silk road or perhaps prior, but more structured trade agreements have been put in place in the 20th<\/sup> century between 2 or more regions allowing for import and export of goods to provide consumers with broader product options and at times lower prices.\u00a0 One of these key agreements was put in place in January of 1994 between the three North American nations, Canada, United States and Mexico.\u00a0 The agreement is known as NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Agreement).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

NAFTA<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The United States commenced bilateral trade negotiations with Canada more than 30 years ago, resulting in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 1989. In 1991, bilateral talks began with Mexico, which Canada joined. The NAFTA followed, entering into force on January 1, 1994. Tariffs were eliminated progressively and all duties and quantitative restrictions, with the exception of those on a limited number of agricultural products traded with Canada, were eliminated by 2008. 6<\/sup><\/p>\n

Starting in 2015, NAFTA became a household name as it was a key topic in the center of then, Republican presidential candidate and current U.S. president, Donald Trump.\u00a0 His beliefs are that NAFTA has brought more harm to the U.S. economy than benefit and should be terminated.\u00a0 The key reason being the loss of manufacturing jobs in U.S. as many automotive companies have moved operations outside of U.S. under this agreement.1<\/sup><\/p>\n

Many industry leaders however believe that NAFTA, though not perfect, has been a key contributor the growth of trade in U.S. over the span of its quarter of a century existence and demolishing it without considering all the consequences will cause significant harm to the auto industry and the U.S. economy as a whole.\u00a0 This is a view shared not only by key automakers in the U.S. (i.e. Ford, GM, Toyota, etc.), but also the sector\u2019s key suppliers, such as Magna International. 2,3,4 <\/sup>(Exhibit 7)<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/sup><\/p>\n

Magna International Inc.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Magna, a Canadian company, is a leading global automotive supplier with 328 manufacturing operations and 99 product development, engineering and sales centers in 29 countries employing over 163,000 individuals, of which, 160 facilities and over 75000 employees work in the NAFTA region (Exhibit 1)<\/strong>.\u00a0 Magna is positioned in the middle of the overall auto industry supply chain as it needs to source parts and supply parts to companies within the NAFTA region. 7<\/sup><\/p>\n

One of the key strategic factors contributing to Magna\u2019s growth and success in the industry has been its agility and flexibility to serve its customers.\u00a0 Their manufacturing sites are often within close proximity of their key suppliers and as a result, they have expanded beyond Canada and have opened many facilities in US & Mexico to serve customers in those regions (i.e. BMW in SC, GM & potentially BMW in San Luis Potosi, MX). 8<\/sup><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Impact of demolishing NAFTA<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Due to the existence of NAFTA, automakers have been able to leverage the lowest parts and labor cost in manufacturing and providing the consumer with the most value for the product.\u00a0 If NAFTA was to demolish and high tariffs were to be added to products imported to the U.S. from Mexico and Canada, the exports would take a hit as well.\u00a0 For example, Magna announced in December of 2016 that it had won BMW\u2019s business for seating products in South Carolina and they plan on opening a 4th<\/sup> manufacturing location in that state employing up to 480 people. 7<\/sup><\/p>\n

Magna also has facilities in Mexico which will likely supply the BMW facility in San Luis Potosi, MX. 8<\/sup>\u00a0 U.S. will import BMW 300 series from Mexico while exporting BMW SUV\u2019s produced in South Carolina to Mexico and Canada.\u00a0 In the short to medium term, Magna will continue operations as is and if tariffs are risen, they will have to pass the cost on to the consumers as moving numerous facilities will result in massive capital expenditure and will not be feasible.<\/p>\n

My recommendation would be for Magna to actively work with the auto industry in North America to use their collective voice and work with law makers at the state level to ensure the agreement is improved rather than terminated as it will be the only win-win situation.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Historical trade data from the United States Census Bureau shows the direct correlation between Import & Export and is kept by country on a monthly basis.\u00a0 Tables and graphs in Exhibits 2 through 6<\/strong> capture this data since 1990. 9 \u00a0<\/sup>\u00a0Arguably reducing import from NAFTA regions will not yield higher jobs in the U.S. and eventually higher exports.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/sup>Exhibit 1\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Magna\u2019s Facility & Employee Distribution in NA<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\nHeadquarter<\/strong><\/td>\nManufacturing \/ Assembly<\/strong><\/td>\nEngineering \/ Sales \/ Product Development<\/strong><\/td>\nEmployees<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
CANADA<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n50<\/td>\n11<\/td>\n21575<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
UNITED STATES<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n58<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n24900<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
MEXICO<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/td>\n0<\/td>\n31<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n29125<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Source: Company Website<\/p>\n

<\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Exhibit 2\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 US Historical Import Export – Global<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
TABLE 1: US Global Trade Value ($ millions USD)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YEAR<\/strong><\/td>\nEXPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nIMPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nBALANCE<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2016<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,451,011<\/td>\n\u00a02,187,805<\/td>\n\u00a0(736,794)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2015<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,503,102<\/td>\n\u00a02,248,183<\/td>\n\u00a0(745,082)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,621,874<\/td>\n\u00a02,356,356<\/td>\n\u00a0(734,482)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2013<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,578,517<\/td>\n\u00a02,267,987<\/td>\n\u00a0(689,470)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2012<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,545,821<\/td>\n\u00a02,276,267<\/td>\n\u00a0(730,446)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2011<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,482,508<\/td>\n\u00a02,207,954<\/td>\n\u00a0(725,447)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2010<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,278,495<\/td>\n\u00a01,913,857<\/td>\n\u00a0(635,362)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2009<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,056,043<\/td>\n\u00a01,559,625<\/td>\n\u00a0(503,582)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2008<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,287,442<\/td>\n\u00a02,103,641<\/td>\n\u00a0(816,199)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2007<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,148,199<\/td>\n\u00a01,956,961<\/td>\n\u00a0(808,762)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2006<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,025,968<\/td>\n\u00a01,853,938<\/td>\n\u00a0(827,971)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2005<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0901,082<\/td>\n\u00a01,673,454<\/td>\n\u00a0(772,372)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2004<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0814,875<\/td>\n\u00a01,469,705<\/td>\n\u00a0(654,830)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2003<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0724,771<\/td>\n\u00a01,257,121<\/td>\n\u00a0(532,350)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2002<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0693,101<\/td>\n\u00a01,161,366<\/td>\n\u00a0(468,265)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2001<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0729,101<\/td>\n\u00a01,140,998<\/td>\n\u00a0(411,898)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2000<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0781,918<\/td>\n\u00a01,218,023<\/td>\n\u00a0(436,105)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1999<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0695,797<\/td>\n\u00a01,024,616<\/td>\n\u00a0(328,819)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1998<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0682,139<\/td>\n\u00a0911,897<\/td>\n\u00a0(229,758)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1997<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0689,180<\/td>\n\u00a0869,703<\/td>\n\u00a0(180,523)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1996<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0625,073<\/td>\n\u00a0795,287<\/td>\n\u00a0(170,213)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1995<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0584,740<\/td>\n\u00a0743,545<\/td>\n\u00a0(158,805)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1994<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0512,625<\/td>\n\u00a0663,252<\/td>\n\u00a0(150,627)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1993<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0465,090<\/td>\n\u00a0580,656<\/td>\n\u00a0(115,566)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1992<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0448,165<\/td>\n\u00a0532,662<\/td>\n\u00a0(84,497)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1991<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0421,730<\/td>\n\u00a0488,453<\/td>\n\u00a0(66,723)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1990<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0393,592<\/td>\n\u00a0495,311<\/td>\n\u00a0(101,718)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AVERAGE<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0931,184 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a01,405,875 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0(474,691)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Source: United States Census Bureau – Foreign Trades<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Note: Figures are not seasonally adjusted<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

Exhibit 3 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 US Historical Import Export – Mexico<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
TABLE 2: US Trade Value w\/Mexico\u00a0 ($ millions USD)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YEAR<\/strong><\/td>\nEXPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nIMPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nBALANCE<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2016<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0229,702<\/td>\n\u00a0294,056<\/td>\n\u00a0(64,354)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2015<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0236,204<\/td>\n\u00a0296,401<\/td>\n\u00a0(60,197)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0241,007<\/td>\n\u00a0295,730<\/td>\n\u00a0(54,723)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2013<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0225,954<\/td>\n\u00a0280,556<\/td>\n\u00a0(54,602)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2012<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0215,875<\/td>\n\u00a0277,594<\/td>\n\u00a0(61,719)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2011<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0198,289<\/td>\n\u00a0262,874<\/td>\n\u00a0(64,585)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2010<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0163,665<\/td>\n\u00a0229,986<\/td>\n\u00a0(66,321)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2009<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0128,892<\/td>\n\u00a0176,654<\/td>\n\u00a0(47,762)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2008<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0151,220<\/td>\n\u00a0215,942<\/td>\n\u00a0(64,722)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2007<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0135,918<\/td>\n\u00a0210,714<\/td>\n\u00a0(74,796)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2006<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0133,722<\/td>\n\u00a0198,253<\/td>\n\u00a0(64,531)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2005<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0120,248<\/td>\n\u00a0170,109<\/td>\n\u00a0(49,861)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2004<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0110,731<\/td>\n\u00a0155,902<\/td>\n\u00a0(45,170)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2003<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a097,412<\/td>\n\u00a0138,060<\/td>\n\u00a0(40,648)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2002<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a097,470<\/td>\n\u00a0134,616<\/td>\n\u00a0(37,146)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2001<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0101,297<\/td>\n\u00a0131,338<\/td>\n\u00a0(30,041)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2000<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0111,349<\/td>\n\u00a0135,926<\/td>\n\u00a0(24,577)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1999<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a086,909<\/td>\n\u00a0109,721<\/td>\n\u00a0(22,812)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1998<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a078,773<\/td>\n\u00a094,629<\/td>\n\u00a0(15,856)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1997<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a071,389<\/td>\n\u00a085,938<\/td>\n\u00a0(14,549)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1996<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a056,792<\/td>\n\u00a074,297<\/td>\n\u00a0(17,506)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1995<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a046,292<\/td>\n\u00a062,100<\/td>\n\u00a0(15,808)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1994<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a050,844<\/td>\n\u00a049,494<\/td>\n\u00a01,350<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1993<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a041,581<\/td>\n\u00a039,918<\/td>\n\u00a01,663<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1992<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a040,592<\/td>\n\u00a035,211<\/td>\n\u00a05,381<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1991<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a033,277<\/td>\n\u00a031,130<\/td>\n\u00a02,148<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1990<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a028,279<\/td>\n\u00a030,157<\/td>\n\u00a0(1,878)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AVERAGE<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0119,766 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0156,196 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0(36,430)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Source: United States Census Bureau – Foreign Trades<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Note: Figures are not seasonally adjusted<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Exhibit 4\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 US Historical Import Export – Canada<\/h3>\n

<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
TABLE 3: US Trade Value w\/Canada\u00a0 ($ millions USD)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YEAR<\/strong><\/td>\nEXPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nIMPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nBALANCE<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2016<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0266,797<\/td>\n\u00a0277,756<\/td>\n\u00a0(10,958)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2015<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0280,855<\/td>\n\u00a0296,231<\/td>\n\u00a0(15,375)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0312,817<\/td>\n\u00a0349,286<\/td>\n\u00a0(36,469)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2013<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0300,755<\/td>\n\u00a0332,504<\/td>\n\u00a0(31,749)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2012<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0292,651<\/td>\n\u00a0324,263<\/td>\n\u00a0(31,613)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2011<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0281,292<\/td>\n\u00a0315,325<\/td>\n\u00a0(34,033)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2010<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0249,257<\/td>\n\u00a0277,637<\/td>\n\u00a0(28,380)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2009<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0204,658<\/td>\n\u00a0226,248<\/td>\n\u00a0(21,591)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2008<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0261,150<\/td>\n\u00a0339,491<\/td>\n\u00a0(78,342)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2007<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0248,888<\/td>\n\u00a0317,057<\/td>\n\u00a0(68,169)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2006<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0230,656<\/td>\n\u00a0302,438<\/td>\n\u00a0(71,782)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2005<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0211,899<\/td>\n\u00a0290,384<\/td>\n\u00a0(78,486)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2004<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0189,880<\/td>\n\u00a0256,360<\/td>\n\u00a0(66,480)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2003<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0169,924<\/td>\n\u00a0221,595<\/td>\n\u00a0(51,671)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2002<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0160,923<\/td>\n\u00a0209,088<\/td>\n\u00a0(48,165)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2001<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0163,424<\/td>\n\u00a0216,268<\/td>\n\u00a0(52,844)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2000<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0178,941<\/td>\n\u00a0230,838<\/td>\n\u00a0(51,897)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1999<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0166,600<\/td>\n\u00a0198,711<\/td>\n\u00a0(32,111)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1998<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0156,604<\/td>\n\u00a0173,256<\/td>\n\u00a0(16,653)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1997<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0151,767<\/td>\n\u00a0167,234<\/td>\n\u00a0(15,467)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1996<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0134,210<\/td>\n\u00a0155,893<\/td>\n\u00a0(21,682)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1995<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0127,226<\/td>\n\u00a0144,370<\/td>\n\u00a0(17,144)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1994<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0114,439<\/td>\n\u00a0128,406<\/td>\n\u00a0(13,967)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1993<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0100,444<\/td>\n\u00a0111,216<\/td>\n\u00a0(10,772)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1992<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a090,594<\/td>\n\u00a098,630<\/td>\n\u00a0(8,036)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1991<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a085,150<\/td>\n\u00a091,064<\/td>\n\u00a0(5,914)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1990<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a083,674<\/td>\n\u00a091,380<\/td>\n\u00a0(7,706)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AVERAGE<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0193,166 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0227,516 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0(34,350)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Source: United States Census Bureau – Foreign Trades<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Note: Figures are not seasonally adjusted<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Exhibit 5\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 US Historical Import Export \u2013 NAFTA Region<\/h3>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
TABLE 4: NAFTA Trade Value ($ millions USD)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YEAR<\/strong><\/td>\nEXPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nIMPORTS<\/strong><\/td>\nBALANCE<\/strong><\/td>\nEXPORT\u00a0 %\u00a0 GLOBAL<\/strong><\/td>\nIMPORT %\u00a0 GLOBAL<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2016<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0496,499<\/td>\n\u00a0571,812<\/td>\n\u00a0(75,312)<\/td>\n34%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2015<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0517,059<\/td>\n\u00a0592,632<\/td>\n\u00a0(75,572)<\/td>\n34%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2014<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0553,824<\/td>\n\u00a0645,016<\/td>\n\u00a0(91,192)<\/td>\n34%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2013<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0526,709<\/td>\n\u00a0613,060<\/td>\n\u00a0(86,351)<\/td>\n33%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2012<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0508,526<\/td>\n\u00a0601,857<\/td>\n\u00a0(93,331)<\/td>\n33%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2011<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0479,580<\/td>\n\u00a0578,198<\/td>\n\u00a0(98,618)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2010<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0412,921<\/td>\n\u00a0507,622<\/td>\n\u00a0(94,701)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2009<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0333,550<\/td>\n\u00a0402,903<\/td>\n\u00a0(69,353)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2008<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0412,370<\/td>\n\u00a0555,433<\/td>\n\u00a0(143,063)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2007<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0384,806<\/td>\n\u00a0527,771<\/td>\n\u00a0(142,964)<\/td>\n34%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2006<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0364,378<\/td>\n\u00a0500,691<\/td>\n\u00a0(136,313)<\/td>\n36%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2005<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0332,146<\/td>\n\u00a0460,493<\/td>\n\u00a0(128,347)<\/td>\n37%<\/td>\n28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2004<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0300,611<\/td>\n\u00a0412,261<\/td>\n\u00a0(111,650)<\/td>\n37%<\/td>\n28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2003<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0267,336<\/td>\n\u00a0359,655<\/td>\n\u00a0(92,319)<\/td>\n37%<\/td>\n29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2002<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0258,393<\/td>\n\u00a0343,704<\/td>\n\u00a0(85,311)<\/td>\n37%<\/td>\n30%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2001<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0264,721<\/td>\n\u00a0347,606<\/td>\n\u00a0(82,885)<\/td>\n36%<\/td>\n30%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
2000<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0290,290<\/td>\n\u00a0366,765<\/td>\n\u00a0(76,475)<\/td>\n37%<\/td>\n30%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1999<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0253,509<\/td>\n\u00a0308,432<\/td>\n\u00a0(54,923)<\/td>\n36%<\/td>\n30%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1998<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0235,376<\/td>\n\u00a0267,885<\/td>\n\u00a0(32,509)<\/td>\n35%<\/td>\n29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1997<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0223,155<\/td>\n\u00a0253,172<\/td>\n\u00a0(30,017)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1996<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0191,002<\/td>\n\u00a0230,190<\/td>\n\u00a0(39,188)<\/td>\n31%<\/td>\n29%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1995<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0173,518<\/td>\n\u00a0206,470<\/td>\n\u00a0(32,952)<\/td>\n30%<\/td>\n28%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1994<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0165,282<\/td>\n\u00a0177,900<\/td>\n\u00a0(12,618)<\/td>\n32%<\/td>\n27%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1993<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0142,025<\/td>\n\u00a0151,134<\/td>\n\u00a0(9,109)<\/td>\n31%<\/td>\n26%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1992<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0131,187<\/td>\n\u00a0133,841<\/td>\n\u00a0(2,654)<\/td>\n29%<\/td>\n25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1991<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0118,427<\/td>\n\u00a0122,194<\/td>\n\u00a0(3,767)<\/td>\n28%<\/td>\n25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
1990<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0111,953<\/td>\n\u00a0121,537<\/td>\n\u00a0(9,584)<\/td>\n28%<\/td>\n25%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
AVERAGE<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0312,932 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0383,712 <\/strong><\/td>\n\u00a0(70,781)<\/strong><\/td>\n33%<\/strong><\/td>\n27%<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Source: United States Census Bureau – Foreign Trades<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Note: Figures are not seasonally adjusted<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Exhibit 6\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 U.S. Import\/Export Trends<\/h3>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/h3>\n

Source: Graph created using US Census Bureau Historical Trade Data 9<\/sup><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/sup><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/sup><\/p>\n

Exhibit 6 (Cont.)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 U.S. Import\/Export Trends<\/h3>\n

\u00a0\"\"<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/sup><\/p>\n

Exhibit 7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 U.S. President & Auto Industry Leaders\u2019 view on NAFTA<\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cThe worst trade deal ever made\u201d Donald J Trump \u2013 US President 1<\/sup><\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cNAFTA agreement has made the overall sector much more competitive on a global basis\u201d Bob Shanks \u2013 CFO Ford Motor Co. 2<\/sup><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cNAFTA has been around a long time, and it probably needs to be modernized, but it has been positive overall for America\u201d Jim Lentz \u2013 CEO Toyota Motor NA 3<\/sup><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u201cI think anybody that is contemplating any big investment over the long term is probably either waiting or going to be biased to invest more in the U.S. until there is an outcome here\u201d Don Walker \u2013 CEO Magna International 4<\/sup><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Endnotes & References<\/h1>\n

1<\/sup> The Washington Post – https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/business\/economy\/trump-twitter-bombs-and-a-negotiating-standoff-how-nafta-talks-could-fail\/2017\/10\/06\/96b25f68-a91b-11e7-850e-2bdd1236be5d_story.html?utm_term=.02674aa642a8<\/a><\/p>\n

2 <\/sup>Bloomberg https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2017-10-27\/nafta-could-be-modernized-but-it-s-mostly-working-carmakers-say<\/a><\/p>\n

3 <\/sup>The Detroit News http:\/\/www.detroitnews.com\/story\/business\/autos\/foreign\/2017\/05\/04\/toyota-lentz-nafta\/101300988\/<\/a><\/p>\n

4 <\/sup>CNBC \u2013 Mad Money with Jim Cramer https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=BLwOdl3p7qE<\/a><\/p>\n

5 <\/sup>Times.com http:\/\/time.com\/4677817\/american-cars-brands-manufacturing\/<\/a><\/p>\n

5 <\/sup>Investopedia https:\/\/www.investopedia.com\/ask\/answers\/052815\/who-are-teslas-tsla-main-suppliers.asp<\/a><\/p>\n

6 <\/sup>Office of the United States Trade Representative https:\/\/ustr.gov\/trade-agreements\/free-trade-agreements\/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta<\/a><\/p>\n

7 <\/sup>Magna International Inc. http:\/\/www.magna.com\/about-magna<\/a><\/p>\n

7 <\/sup>Magna International Inc. http:\/\/www.magna.com\/media\/press-releases-news\/releases-news\/2016\/12\/06\/magna-secures-new-seat-business<\/a><\/p>\n

8 <\/sup>Auto News http:\/\/www.autonews.com\/article\/20160801\/OEM10\/160729860\/in-mexico-bmw-builds-supply-base-from-scratch<\/a><\/p>\n

9 <\/sup>United States Census Bureau https:\/\/www.census.gov\/foreign-trade\/balance\/index.html<\/a><\/p>\n

Tables and graphs in the Exhibits 2 through 6 were generated using the annual trade figures reported by the US Census Bureau<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Impact of terminating NAFTA on the auto industry – specifically Magna International<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10317,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","categories":[2271,3877,3239,3219,17],"class_list":["post-24839","hck-submission","type-hck-submission","status-publish","hentry","category-auto-industry","category-global-trade","category-isolationism","category-nafta","category-supply-chain","hck-taxonomy-organization-magna-international","hck-taxonomy-industry-auto","hck-taxonomy-country-canada"],"connected_submission_link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/assignment\/rc-tom-challenge-2017\/","yoast_head":"\nIMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Impact of terminating NAFTA on the auto industry - specifically Magna International\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Technology and Operations Management\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-11-30T17:52:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2017\/11\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2-300x300.jpg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"7 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/\",\"name\":\"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/4\\\/2017\\\/11\\\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2-300x300.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2017-11-15T23:37:37+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-11-30T17:52:49+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/4\\\/2017\\\/11\\\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/4\\\/2017\\\/11\\\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2.jpg\",\"width\":500,\"height\":500},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Submissions\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/submission\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/\",\"name\":\"Technology and Operations Management\",\"description\":\"MBA Student Perspectives\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"性视界Action\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/d3.harvard.edu\\\/platform-rctom\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management","og_description":"Impact of terminating NAFTA on the auto industry - specifically Magna International","og_url":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/","og_site_name":"Technology and Operations Management","article_modified_time":"2017-11-30T17:52:49+00:00","og_image":[{"url":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2017\/11\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2-300x300.jpg","type":"","width":"","height":""}],"twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"7 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/","url":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/","name":"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA - Technology and Operations Management","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2017\/11\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2-300x300.jpg","datePublished":"2017-11-15T23:37:37+00:00","dateModified":"2017-11-30T17:52:49+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2017\/11\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2017\/11\/3b7a16c347a864aac331c161a165fac2.jpg","width":500,"height":500},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/impact-of-global-trade-agreements-on-the-auto-industry-and-its-supply-chain-terminating-nafta\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Submissions","item":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY AND ITS SUPPLY CHAIN \u2013 TERMINATING NAFTA"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/#website","url":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/","name":"Technology and Operations Management","description":"MBA Student Perspectives","potentialAction":[{"@type":"性视界Action","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/hck-submission\/24839","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/hck-submission"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/hck-submission"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10317"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24839"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/hck-submission\/24839\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24839"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24839"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}