A\u00a0Japanese company founded in 1934, Fujifilm started manufacturing film for motion pictures\u00a0based on a government plan to establish a domestic photographic film manufacturing industry.[3] In the 1960s, it began its endeavor to expand its\u00a0business overseas, in an aim to\u00a0catch up to the dominant industry leader, Kodak. \u00a0In the 1980s, it became apparent to both Kodak and Fujifilm that the age of digital photography was right around the corner, and from a global peak in 2000, demand for camera film dropped 90% in 10 years as the digital revolution transformed the industry. \u00a0[4]<\/p>\n
Fujifilm’s Response<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Like Kodak, Fujifilm continued to reap profits from film sales, invested in digital technologies and tried to diversify into new areas. \u00a0At both firms, the employees in the profitable film division were in control and late to admit that the film business was a thing of the past. \u00a0So, why the different outcomes?<\/p>\n Although the two companies shared similar assumptions and internal politics, the differentiating factor was in execution. \u00a0What Fujifilm did was go one step further\u00a0than simply shift\u00a0to digital photography from analog.\u00a0 Instead, it leveraged its\u00a0chemical expertise to pioneer new business fields. \u00a0Under Shigetaka Komori, who became President in 2000 and CEO\u00a0in 2003, Fujifilm underwent a bold and distinctly un-Japanese process of structural reform and aggressive acquisition.\u00a0 They\u00a0looked at the fields to which its existing technology could be adapted and started acquiring companies that would complement their business. They moved into digital X-ray and endoscopes; they now have a 70% world market share of tac film, an essential component of all LCD screens.[4]<\/p>\n Another\u00a0area it pursued\u00a0was cosmetics (which they call “Life Science”), which was set up as a division in 2006. \u00a0They found that the chemicals they developed over the years to prevent color in\u00a0photographs from fading, could be used on skin too. \u00a0Unknowingly, in their efforts to perfect film stock the researchers had been laying the groundwork for a skincare business. (Below shows nanoparticles of Astaxanthin, a red ingredient filled with beauty power, that Fujifilm formulated which became the basis of their skincare products.)<\/p>\n Lessons from Kodak<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n In contrast to Fujifilm, who\u00a0realized the need to develop in-house expertise in the new businesses, Kodak believed its core strength lay in its strong brand and marketing, and could simply partner or buy itself into new industries, such as chemicals and drugs. \u00a0However, this approach proved unsuccessful as they realized without in-house expertise, they lacked the ability to effectively vet acquisition candidate, integrate companies it had purchased and negotiate profitable partnerships.<\/p>\n For example, when sales from film developing and printing were dwindling, some revenue could still be gained by installing kiosks to print digital photos. \u00a0Whereas Fujifilm had its own system, Kodak needed to partner with another firm\u2014and thus share the income. \u00a0Moreover, when Fujifilm applied their\u00a0kiosk technology to other businesses in its digital-imaging division, Kodak could not since\u00a0it didn’t\u00a0own the technology.<\/p>\n Conclusion<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n In an age where technological advances are occurring faster than ever, companies need to be more proactive in sensing and adapting to the changing times. \u00a0Fujifilm’s example reminds\u00a0us the importance of having in-house expertise\u00a0and constantly looking into new technologies. \u00a0It also teaches us that “execution” is just as critical as having the right “strategy”.<\/p>\n [727 words]<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sources:<\/p>\n [1]\u00a0K.N.C (2012) Sharper focus. Available at: http:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/schumpeter\/2012\/01\/how-fujifilm-survived (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n [2]\u00a0L, B. (2013) Kodak moments just a memory as company exits bankruptcy. Available at: https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2013-09-03\/kodak-exits-bankruptcy-as-printer-without-photographs (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n [3]\u00a0Corporation, F. \u00a0Fujifilm global. Available at: http:\/\/www.fujifilm.com\/products\/skincare\/history\/ (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n [4]\u00a0Monocle (2013) Renewal process – issue 60 – magazine. Available at: https:\/\/monocle.com\/magazine\/issues\/60\/renewal-process\/ (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n [5] Foundation, N.C. (2011) Fujifilm finds new life in cosmetics. Available at: http:\/\/www.nippon.com\/en\/features\/c00511\/ (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n [Featured Images] Corporation, F. \u00a0Photogenic beauty. Available at: http:\/\/astalift.com.bd\/astalift\/ (Accessed: November 2016).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" “Kodak acted like a stereotypical change-resistant Japanese firm, while Fujifilm acted like a flexible American one.” -The Economist [1]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1877,"featured_media":16669,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","categories":[],"class_list":["post-14837","hck-submission","type-hck-submission","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"connected_submission_link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/assignment\/digitization-challenge-2016\/","yoast_head":"\n![\"pic_03\"](\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2016\/11\/pic_03-300x202.jpg\")
\nIn 2007, Fujifilm launched their anti-aging skincare line ‘ASTALIFT’\u00a0which quickly gained popularity. \u00a0In the following years they expanded to China, Southeast Asia, and Europe, while becoming one of Japan\u2019s top-selling anti-aging skincare brands. [5]<\/p>\n
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