A rapidly warming Arctic, accompanied by the record low levels of polar sea ice, is among the most prominent physical effects of climate change. This trend is expected continue, opening new and previously unnavigable waterways to the global community. As a result, lucrative economic opportunities stand poised to drive intense competition for resources and competing territorial claims. Experts believe that the Arctic seabed holds nearly a quarter of the planet\u2019s untapped oil and gas resources and that open channels in the North could significantly reduce transit times for the commercial shipping industry. At the same time, the economic benefit promised by increased activity in this extreme environment carries with it significant risk for accidents, aggression and geopolitical miscalculation.<\/p>\n
In A Cooperative Strategy for 21st<\/sup> Century Seapower<\/em>, the United States Navy commits itself to upholding \u201cthe secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the free flow of goods\u201d and cites forward presence as a critical component of its operating model. However, as the effects of climate change in the Arctic increase the strategic need for US naval leadership, they simultaneously pose serious challenges to the Navy\u2019s ability to operate effectively in this region.<\/p>\n In the near-term, the US Navy will likely find itself strained to deliver meaningful forward presence in the Arctic due to current technological, logistical and financial limitations. Although the United States\u2019 submarine fleet continues its decades-long practice of operating in waters beneath the polar ice, these military missions aren\u2019t appropriate to foster geopolitical stability or enforce international economic norms. Instead, this task requires a robust and visible surface presence. According to retired Admiral David Titley: \u201cVirtual presence is physical absence. It\u2019s all well and good to say you have interests in the Arctic, but if you can only be on the surface where there is little or no danger of ice, then your presence is very restricted.\u201d<\/p>\n Titley highlights a key limiting factor on the Navy\u2019s operating model: sea ice. Whereas the US surface force enjoys nearly unrestricted freedom of navigation around the globe, this capability is somewhat diminished by icy conditions in the newly-opening seaways of the Arctic. No surface ship in the fleet has undergone an expensive hardening process recommended by the Center for Naval Analyses and crews lack comprehensive training in Arctic operations. As a result, ships are limited to open-water operations conducted only during the warmer months \u2013 and even these can be constrained by unpredictable weather, shifting ice floes, and complex logistics. Icebreakers, heavy vessels designed to smash routes through sea ice, can potentially alleviate these issues; but with only two of these specialized ships in its inventory, US capacity for icebreaking support to the military is severely limited.<\/p>\n This wouldn\u2019t be as much of an issue if other Arctic nations were also facing similar limitations. Russia, however, maintains a fleet of over 40 icebreakers \u2013 including multiple nuclear-powered vessels \u2013 with a reported 14 under construction. In the words of Alaska Senator Dan Sullivan: \u201cThe highways of the Arctic are icebreakers. Right now the Russians have superhighways and we have dirt roads with potholes.\u201d Russia\u2019s icebreakers afford its Northern Fleet freedom of maneuver in the region and the buildup could be viewed in terms of Russia\u2019s recently updated military doctrine and increasingly provocative foreign policy. Suffice it to say that, to some, Russia appears more interested in claiming territory and resources than upholding international maritime norms. Climate change, then, has pushed the US Navy toward a strategic inflection point in the Arctic: in a place where American naval presence may be most urgent, the organization finds itself at risk of not being able to provide it.<\/p>\n To address challenges in the Arctic, the Navy chartered Task Force Climate Change in 2009 to make recommendations for adapting to and mitigating the risks associated with the changing environment. Its first major output was the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap<\/em>, a time-phased approach to accomplishing strategic end-states through 2030. Additionally, Congress has earmarked nearly $1 billion to build a new icebreaker as a joint-venture between the Navy and Coast Guard, a project that may take 3-10 years. While this is a promising start, I would recommend two additional steps. First, close the icebreaker gap in the near-term by contracting with proven shipbuilders, such as Finland\u2019s Arctia, to both build new vessels and lend expertise to homegrown projects. Second, the United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Of the five Arctic nations, the US is the only country that hasn\u2019t adopted the treaty; Congress claims that it cedes too much authority to international arbitration. The treaty would strengthen America\u2019s ability to credibly enforce territorial sovereignty in expanding Arctic waters and deter\u00a0other nations from disregarding UNCLOS rulings, similar to last summer’s scenario in the South China Sea\u00a0(800 words).<\/p>\n <\/p>\n References<\/em><\/p>\n Cardin, Ben. “The South China Sea is the Reason the United States Must Ratify UNCLOS,”\u00a0Foreign Policy.<\/em> 13 July 2016. \u00a0www.foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/07\/13\/the-south-china-sea-is-the-reason-the-united-states-must-ratify-unclos\/<\/p>\n De Luce, Dan; Johnson, Keith. “U.S. Falls Behind in Arctic Great Game,”\u00a0Foreign Policy<\/em>. 24 May 2016. www.foreignpolicy.com\/2016\/05\/24\/u-s-falls-behind-in-arctic-great-game\/<\/p>\n Harvey, Fiona. “Arctic Sea Ice Fell to Record Low in May,”\u00a0The Guardian<\/em>. 08 June 2016. www.theguardian.com\/environment\/2016\/jun\/08\/arctic-sea-ice-falls-to-record-low.<\/p>\n Judson, Jen. “The Icebreaker Gap,”\u00a0Politico<\/em>. 01 September 2015.\u00a0www.politico.eu\/article\/russia-france-arctic-icebreaker-defense\/<\/p>\n Kuertsen, Andreas. “Icebreakers and US Power: Separating Fact from Fiction,”\u00a0War on the Rocks.\u00a0<\/em>11 October 2016. \u00a0www.warontherocks.com\/2016\/10\/icebreakers-and-u-s-power-separating-fact-from-fiction\/<\/p>\n Kurek, Laura. “The Race for the Arctic,”\u00a0The Wilson Quarterly.<\/em> 20 July 2015. www.wilsonquarterly.com\/stories\/the-race-for-the-arctic\/<\/p>\n Roughhead, Gary. “Getting Serious About the Arctic: US Interests in the North,” 性视界 International Review. 14 April 2015. \u00a0hir.harvard.edu\/getting-serious-about-the-arctic-us-interests-in-the-north\/<\/p>\n A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower<\/em>. Department of the Navy. March 2015.<\/p>\n U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030.<\/em> Task Force Climate Change, Department of the Navy. February 2014.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" as melting polar ice uncovers a potential treasure trove of untapped resources in the north, can the us navy achieve the forward presence it deems necessary to uphold international norms?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2587,"featured_media":13225,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","categories":[1398,1218,135,1352,1681],"class_list":["post-13224","hck-submission","type-hck-submission","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-arctic","category-climate-change","category-military","category-navy","category-ship"],"connected_submission_link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/assignment\/climate-change-challenge-2016\/","yoast_head":"\n